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3.1 Research Design and Data 
For	the	analysis	section	of	this	thesis	to	include	a	well	thought	out	sample	size,	it	was	
necessary	to	determine	speeches	that	occur	consistently	and	regardless	of	the	president.	
Therefore,	the	annual	hearings	before	the	Plenary	was	decided	as	the	sample	material.	With	
the	added	exclusion	of	Lagarde	because	of	the	short	time	of	her	tenure	as	of	yet.	As	
mentioned,	in	her	case,	quarterly	hearings	were	utilized.		
	
The	reason	for	choosing	these	specific	materials	is	that	they	provide	a	clear	and	thorough	
narrative	on	what	has	been	discussed	before	the	Plenary	and	the	Committee.	These	
particular	hearings	are	meant	for	the	presidents	to	go	over	the	economic	developments	and	
monetary	policies,	the	overall	functioning	of	the	institutions	in	addition	to	the	outlook	for	
the	near	future.	Thus,	they	provide	an	excellent	setting	for	analysing	how	and	what	has	
changed	over	the	years	and	different	presidents	in	addition	to	what	flaws	are	inherently	
visible	and	how	the	presidents	conveyed	their	message	across	in	the	hearings.		It	is	also	
noteworthy	that	solely	the	hearings	of	the	presidents	were	chosen	and	not,	for	example	
council	members.	This	was	decided	because	even	though	a	president	of	the	ECB	is	only	a	
part	of	the	decision-making	organ,	they	nevertheless	wield	enormous	power	and	influence	
on	the	world	economy.	The	heads	of	supranational	institutions	are	aware	of	this	and	based	
on	their	influence,	they	harness	the	power	of	language	to	convey	their	messages.	As	such,	it	
is	obvious	that	the	president’s	views	are	reflected	in	the	policies	implemented	and	in	a	way	
that	the	public	and	market	actors	react	to	this.	Additionally,	members	of	the	press	and	
public	follow	every	single	world	the	ECB	president	says	more	closely	than	that	of	the	
governing	council	members	(Stiglitz,	2017).	The	speeches	include	the	presidents	discussing	
structural	deficiencies	in	the	national	government's	fiscal	policies,	the	ineffectiveness	of	
supranational	institutions,	and	how	the	economic	policies	of	EMU	have	changed	along	with	
the	transformation	of	the	ECB	monetary	policy.		
3.2. Method 
Critical	Discourse	Analysis	(CDA)	was	chosen	as	a	method	as	it	is	well	suited	to	building	a	
narrative	relying	on	statements	and	hearings	by	the	presidents	regarding	their	views	and	
thoughts	on	how	the	EMU	is	functioning		and	how	the	monetary	policies	of	the	ECB	
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monetary	policy	has	changed	over	the	years.	The	fundamental	ideas	of	CDA	were	based	on	
critical	thinking	as	a	way	to	view	society.	Critical	studies	have	been	used	in	the	past	to	
pursue	discussions	in	power	relations,	social	power	and	control	over	groups.	Presently,	
some	of	its	concepts	include	critical	exploration	of	knowledge,	attitudes,	social	phenomena	
and	ideologies.	However,	it	may	also	be	utilized	in	analyzing	political	discussion	as	by	
applying	the	theory,	it	is	possible	to	investigate	the	words	and	tone	used	by	the	speakers	to	
interpret	different	meanings.	As	such,	the	approach	is	suitable	for	analysing	the	discourse	of	
these	annual	hearings	because	they	are	consistent	and	multiple	(Van	Dijk,	1993).	
	
Therefore,	by	utilising	this	method,	it	is	possible	to	identify	different	discourses	for	the	
monetary	union	problems	and	the	incompleteness	of	the	EMU.	Furthermore,	it	is	possible	to	
create	a	narrative	by	focusing	on	what	kind	of	language	the	presidents	have	been	using	
through	their	hearings	and	what	are	the	topics	that	are	repetitive.	CDA	is	also	an	approach	
that	encompasses	different	disciplines	and	is	used	to	study	language	or	in	other	words,	talk	
and	text.	The	method	can	be	used	to	research	different	topics,	such	as	power	relations,	
social	interactions,	economic	situations	in	fields	of	politics,	education	and	politics	for	
example	(Fairclough,	2010).	The	approach	might	differ	depending	on	the	person	utilising	it	
and	clear-cut	rules	are	difficult	to	mention.	However,	some	characterizations	can	be	
observed	according	to	Van	Dijk	(1995):	
	
● “It	is	problem	or	issue-oriented,	rather	than	paradigm-oriented.	Any	theoretical	or	
methodological	approach	is	appropriate	as	long	as	it	is	able	to	effectively	study	the	
related	problems.		
● Historically,	and	systematically,	CDA	is	a	part	of	a	broad	spectrum	of	critical	studies	
in	the	humanities	and	social	sciences.		
● Among	the	descriptive,	explanatory	and	practical	aims	of	CDA-	studies	is	the	attempt	
to	uncover,	reveal	or	disclose	what	is	implicit	(pp.	18)”.		
	
It	is	important	to	remember	though	that	CDA	does	not	belong	to	one	specific	school	of	
thought,	rather	it	takes	a	critical	approach	or	position	to	study	talk	and	text.	Therefore,	it	is	
more	than	well-suited	for	this	thesis	and	the	analysis	on	the	hearings	of	the	ECB	presidents	
and	their	statements	regarding	the	incompleteness	of	the	EMU,	their	power	assertions	and	
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to	study	the	change	in	the	monetary	policy	the	ECB	has	been	conducting.	Generally	
speaking,	the	role	of	critical	discourse	analysis	is	to	investigate	and	reveal	underlying	
problems	in	a	given	community,	for	example	political	problems	regarding	the	ECB	
presidents’	view	of	the	EMU.	By	conducting	this	sort	of	an	analysis,	I	attempt	to	uncover	
“hidden”	messages	in	the	way	each	president	chooses	his	or	her	words.	The	language	the	
speakers	use	and	the	tone	of	their	sentences	are	crucial	to	understanding	their	underlying	
meanings.		
	
Additionally,	earlier	mentioned	hawk	and	dove	definitions	will	be	utilized	in	the	following	
analysis	section,	as	these	are	prime	examples	of	how	a	central	banker	might	use	the	power	
of	language	in	conveying	his	or	her	message	for	the	audience.	Thus,	focus	will	be	given	to	
sentences	encouraging	either	accommodative	or	constrictive	monetary	policies	in	addition	
to	the	speakers	communicating	their	views	on	the	problems	of	the	EMU.	Furthermore,	I	
mean	to	emphasize	certain	aspects	by	quoting	a	sentence	in	addition	to	lifting	some	
wordings	from	the	speeches	to	indicate	a	structure	how	the	presidents	communicate	and	
convey	their	messages.		
3.3 Limitations 
Regarding	the	scope	of	limitations	for	the	thesis,	it	is	obvious	that	there	will	be	constraints	
of	different	types.	With	an	analysis	such	as	this,	it	is	always	vital	to	take	time	and	material	
limitations	into	consideration.	Within	the	short	span	of	a	master’s	thesis	process,	it	is	
impossible	to	conduct	thorough	research,	as	the	presidents	have	been	in	hundreds	of	
hearings	and	have	given	even	more	speeches	concerning	the	subject	in	different	forums.	
Thus,	due	to	time	constraints,	limitations	and	clarity,	it	was	necessary	to	decide	on	an	event	
or	a	situation	that	occurs	consistently	and	regardless	of	who	is	leading	the	European	Central	
Bank.	It	was	also	necessary	to	limit	the	sample	material	in	terms	of	its	relevance.	Annual	
hearings	include	important	talking	points	for	the	presidents	regarding	how	they	view	the	
overall	functioning	of	the	ECB	and	EMU.	However,	it	is	worthy	of	an	acknowledgement	that	
basing	a	study	on	larger	sample	size	could	have	provided	different	results	or	altered	my	
conclusions	on	the	subject	matter.	Additionally,	even	though	the	material	will	span	from	the	
year	2003	until	2020,	it	is	worth	a	mention	that	only	minor	focus	will	be	given	to	the	
 37 
hearings	before	2007	as	I	feel	the	years	before	the	global	financial	crisis	are	not	as	relevant	
as	the	years	after	that	regarding	the	research	questions	of	this	thesis.		
	
Additionally,	I	need	to	be	aware	that	critical	discourse	analysis	does	not	reveal	underlying	
truths	and	cannot	read	what	the	person	whose	speech	is	being	analyzed	is	thinking.	As	such,	
this	analysis	aims	to	gain	further	knowledge	in	how	language,	statements	and	arguments	
being	used	can	emphasize	the	message.	Therefore,	assumptions	need	to	be	made	and	these	
need	to	be	carefully	examined.	
4	Analysis	
As	mentioned,	focus	will	be	given	to	three	presidents	that	served	the	central	bank	during	
the	Euro	crisis	and	further	on	amidst	the	COVID-19	pandemic.	These	three	persons	were	and	
are	different	in	their	backgrounds	as	well	as	their	perspectives	on	what	the	European	
Central	Bank	should	look	like.	Hence,	it	is	logical	that	this	is	reflected	on	their	opinions.	It	is	
also	worthy	of	a	mention	that	the	role	of	different	crises	have	been	and	are	crucial	for	the	
evolution	of	institutions	in	addition	to	the	roles	of	their	leaders.	Therefore,	the	impact	of,	
for	example	the	Euro	crisis	was	that	it	revealed	problems,	holes	and	flaws	in	the	framework	
of	both	the	EMU	and	the	ECB.	Were	it	not	the	case,	there	would	not	be	debates	regarding	
the	ECB	exceeding	their	mandates	or	overstepping	their	boundaries.	The	global	financial	
crisis	and	the	subsequent	Euro	crisis	showed	that	the	EMU	was	flawed	from	the	start	and	
the	common	currency	was	not	as	strong	as	the	public	was	made	to	believe.	Whereas	the	
corona	crisis	has	been	handled	relatively	better	and	faster,	in	a	sense	that	this	time	the	ECB	
was	not	afraid	to	inject	money	into	the	markets.	However,	what	the	implemented	policies	
have	shown	is	that	it	might	be	that	the	ECB	has	run	out	of	ammunition.	
4.1	Trichet	(03-11):	Austerity	Measures	and	Incomprehensible	Decisions	
Jean-Claude	Trichet	succeeded	Willem	Duisenberg	in	2003	and	he	spent	the	whole	eight	
year	fixed-term	as	the	President	of	the	ECB.	Taking	over	the	position	after	only	four	years	
since	the	inception	of	the	ECB,	his	tenure	at	the	helm	has	been	described	as	eventful,	to	say	
the	least.	According	to	Stiglitz	(2017):	
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“Trichet	will	be	remembered	for	his	colossal	misjudgements,	in	particular	raising	
interest	rates	at	moments	where	the	economy	was	contracting.	He	demonstrated	a	
commitment	to	fulfilling	the	ECB’s	mandate,	fighting	inflation,	come	what	may.	He	
played	a	disastrous	role	in	the	development	of	the	euro	crisis…(pp.	165)”.	
	
Trichet	did	seem	adamant	in	focusing	solely	on	the	primary	mandate	of	the	ECB	in	
maintaining	price	stability	and	through	it,	fighting	inflation.	It	is	evident	from	his	statements	
that	this	is	what	he	and	the	Governing	Council	cared	about	as	especially	during	the	first	
years	of	his	presidency,	he	never	forgot	to	mention	the	inflation	targets	of	close	to,	but	
below	2%	and	how	this	had	been	a	success	with	an	average	inflation	rate	of	1,95%	within	
the	Eurozone.	This,	of	course,	was	wonderful	and	could	be	regarded	as	a	success.	However,	
what	his	statements	are	missing	is	that	the	fluctuation	of	the	inflation	rate	within	Eurozone	
countries	had	been	large,	in	some	cases	many	percentage	points.	In	many	cases,	the	divide	
had	been	among	the	“northern”		and	“southern”	countries.	Additionally,	Trichet	referred	to	
the	time	when	the	single	currency	and	the	EMU	were	established		with	a	clear	implication	
that	inflation	rates	were	much	higher	in	the	Eurozone	before,	mostly	using	Germany	as	a	
prime	example.	However,	Stiglitz	notes	that	inflation	was	never	the	issue,	even	when	the	
Eurozone	was	founded	(Stiglitz,	2017).	The	inflation	rates	have	been	fluctuating	even	after	
the	establishment	of	the	ECB,	even	many	percentage	points	between	countries.	Yes,	the	
average	is	1,95%,	yet	he	does	not	go	into	specifics	so	as	to	circle	around	the	detail.	What	is	
also	evident	when	studying	the	history	is	that	the	EMU	failed	to	acknowledge	that	Europe	
and	the	Eurozone	is	a	vast	area	of	hundreds	of	millions	of	people	with	a	multitude	of	
different	languages,	cultures	and	governments	that	conduct	economic	and	fiscal	policies	in	
various	ways.	By	attempting	to	gather	them	under	the	same	umbrella	has	not	been	
unproblematic	and	it	has	also	led	to	difficulties	in	managing	the	monetary	policy.	Thus,	it	
could	be	concluded	that	from	the	start	that	the	primary	mandate	of	the	ECB	was	somewhat	
limited	in	its	scope.	
	
Since	the	beginning	of	his	tenure,	Trichet	more	or	less	unequivocally	praised	the	European	
Central	Bank	and	called	on	national	governments	and/or	other	institutions	to	do	more	for	
the	Eurozone.	In	his	first	hearing	at	the	European	Parliament,	he	mentioned	that	he	has	
been	disappointed	in	the	fiscal	policies	of	national	governments	and	further	implored	
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structural	reforms	and	adherence	to	the	rules	of	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact,	stating	the	
no	Excessive	Deficit	Procedures	(EDP)	had	been	implemented.	This	event	is	also	one	of	the	
many	where	he	mentioned	that	the	sound	and	credible	monetary	policy	of	the	ECB	is	not	
sufficient	in	itself,	proper	fiscal	policies	are	needed	as	well:	
	
“A	sound	and	credible	monetary	policy	is	a	necessary	condition	for	sustainable	
growth	and	job	creation	but	is	not	in	itself	a	sufficient	condition.	Other	conditions	
must	be	met,	in	particular,	sound	fiscal	policies	and	appropriate	structural	reforms.	
In	this	respect,	in	the	area	of	fiscal	policy	the	year	2003	proved	disappointing	
(Trichet,	2004)”.	
	
This	statement	is	a	prime	example	of	Trichet	asserting	himself	as	a	monetary	hawk	in	
respect	that	he	promoted,	in	particular,	fiscal	policies	and	structural	reforms.	The	
commanding	tone	of	the	sentences	indicate	a	powerful	central	banker,	who	is	in	a	position	
to	demand	changes	and	improvements	to	steer	the	economy	onto	its	proper	path.	The	
following	years	his	opinion	did	not	waiver	and	he	felt	that	the	fiscal	policies	are	still	a	
problem,	the	results	far	from	satisfactory	in	addition	to	promoting	budgetary	consolidation.	
Furthermore,	he	is	a	strong	supporter	of	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	and	his	frustration	is	
clear	from	the	repetitive	comments	on	the	need	to	comply	with	the	provisions	of	the	SGP	in	
fiscal	consolidation	(Trichet,	2005;	Trichet,	2007).	In	2008	when	Trichet	recalled	the	
economic	and	monetary	developments	from	the	past	year	he	again	reminded	the	European	
Parliament	that	economic	divergences	cannot	be	addressed	by	monetary	policy,	structural	
reforms	by	national	governments	must	be	undertaken:	
 
“The	draft	resolution	also	refers	to	the	risks	posed	by	economic	differentials	across	
euro	area	countries,	which	to	some	extent	reflect	structural	rigidities	and/or	
inappropriate	national	policies.	It	goes	without	saying	that	economic	divergences	
across	euro	area	countries	cannot	be	addressed	by	monetary	policy	(Trichet,	2008)”.	
As	a	supranational	entity,	the	ECB	is,	in	a	way,	supervising	the	whole	Eurozone	and	its	
president	is	therefore	comfortable	in	demanding	change	from	national	governments	by	
using	carefully	selected	phrasing	of	sentences.	Additionally,	it	seemed	that	Trichet	is	of	the	
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opinion	that	the	ECB	is	the	only	institution	trying	to	keep	the	Eurozone	on	the	right	path	
while	other	institutions	and	governments	are	merely	waiting.	This	similar	argumentation	
continues	in	the	next	Plenary	hearings,	when	Trichet	continued	to	focus	on	the	smooth	
functioning	of	the	EMU	and	how	it	will	not	be	possible	to	go	forward	with	the	“monetary”	
side	of	the	union,	the	“economic”	pillar	is	needed	as	well.	Furthermore,	he	argued	for	more	
and	improved	economic	governance	and	financial	regulation.	Additionally,	in	his	last	Plenary	
hearing	he	briefly	mentioned	the	upcoming	establishment	of	the	European	Systemic	Risk	
Board	(ESRB)	as	a	major	improvement	in	financial	supervision	and	the	EMU	framework	
(Trichet,	2010a;	Trichet,	2010b).	
	
What	is	evident	from	these	hearings,	is	that	Trichet	was	wholeheartedly	content	in	how	the	
ECB	had	managed	through	the	years.	He	insinuated	that	the	European	Central	Bank	cannot	
do	anything	wrong,	rather	the	difficult	times	and	the	crises	the	Eurozone	had	endured	were	
the	results	of	weak	European	integration,	lack	of	strict	fiscal	policies	by	national	
governments	and	exogenous	actors.	It	is	understandable	that	before	the	Euro	crisis	things	
seemed	to	be	going	well	and	the	Euro	project	had	succeeded.	After	the	signs	of	a	financial	
crisis	in	the	United	States	began	to	show	in	Europe,	he	seemed	to	increase	the	arguments	of		
national	governments	structuring	their	fiscal	policies	properly,	emphasizing	the	need	for	
prudency.	It	is	clear	from	his	statements	that	he	felt	that	fiscal	consolidation	and	economic	
growth	goes	hand	in	hand.	As	such,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	to	think	back	on	the	austerity	
measures	imposed	on	Greece	during	the	Greek	government	debt	crisis	with	Trichet	at	the	
helm	of	the	ECB	(naturally,	there	were	other	actors	involved	in	the	Troika	as	well).	It	is	also	
noteworthy	that	Jürgen	Stark	was	the	chief	economist	at	the	ECB	during	Trichet’s	tenure.	
Stark	is	a	model	representation	of	a	German	ordoliberal	economist	and	thus,	it	comes	as	no	
surprise	that	the	ECB	conducted	hawkish	monetary	policies	during	this	time.	Finally,	in	
addition	to	calling	for	more	prudential	and	stricter	fiscal	policies	in	his	hearings,	Trichet	
emphasised	the	contribution	of	the	monetary	pillar	and	how	the	economic	one	has	been	
less	flattering.	He	derives	the	problems	of	the	crisis	in	insufficient	discipline	of	policy	makers	
and	the	lack	of	adhering	to	the	rules	of	the	SGP.	These	speeches	strengthen	Trichet’s	stance	
as	a	hawk	and	implies	that	he	is	looking	to	get	back	on	restoring	the	monetary	policy	of	the	
ECB	on	its	track	as	soon	as	national	governments	function	properly.	One	of	the	attempts	to	
return	to	this	path	was	the	establishment	of	the	already	European	Systemic	Risk	Board	
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(ESRB)	that	was	established	to	oversee	the	financial	activity	within	the	European	Union	and	
thus,	provide	the	much	commanded	macroprudential	supervision.	Though	independent,	the	
ECB	acts	as	the	host	and	parent	agency.		
4.2	Draghi	(11-19):	Whatever	it	takes,	QE	&	Unconventional	Policies	
Mario	Draghi	served	as	the	President	of	the	European	Central	Bank	from	2011	until	2019	
and	it	was	during	his	tenure	that	a	distinct	differentiation	from	Trichet’s	policies	was	seen.	
He	inherited	a	rather	difficult	economic	situation	from	Trichet	and	the	Eurozone	had	dire	
times	ahead.	The	monetary	policies	implemented	took	a	swift	turn	and	it	was	seen	that	the	
hawkish,	contractionary	style	had	not	produced	a	desired	eventual	outcome.	The	Eurozone	
was	struggling	with	national	debts	and	drastic	measures	were	needed	to	save	the	Eurozone.	
At	his	first	appearance	at	the	Plenary	of	the	European	Parliament	in	December	2011,	Draghi	
emphasized	the	limited	influence	the	ECB	could	make	with	monetary	policy	alone	and	
implored	the	governments	to	individually	and	collectively	restore	credibility	with	regards	to	
the	financial	markets.	He	noted	that	the	establishment	of	the	Six	Pack	and	European	
Semester	were	improvements	over	the	Eurozone	fiscal	supervision	and	add	more	intense	
scrutiny	over	economic	policies,	in	addition	to	the	need	for	a	new	fiscal	compact:	
	
“I	am	confident	the	new	surveillance	framework	will	restore	confidence	over	time.	I	
am	also	quite	sure	that	countries	overall	are	on	the	right	track.	But	a	credible	signal	
is	needed	to	give	ultimate	assurance	over	the	short	term.	What	I	believe	our	
economic	and	monetary	union	needs	is	a	new	fiscal	compact	–	a	fundamental	
restatement	of	the	fiscal	rules	together	with	the	mutual	fiscal	commitments	that	
euro	area	governments	have	made	(Draghi,	2011)”.	
In	his	first	hearing,	it	seemed	as	though	Draghi	was	asserting	his	power	dominance	over	the	
Plenary	because	otherwise,	he	is	speaking	from	the	ECB	perspective.	Meaning	that	he	most	
often	referred	to	the	ECB	as	“we”,	whereas	in	these	few	instances	he	was	commanding	
attention	to	his	own	thoughts	and	views.	Regarding	the	economic	outlook	and	measures	
needed	to	battle	the	ongoing	crisis,	he	implied	that	Treaty	changes	should	not	be	
completely	discarded,	yet	faster	processes	were	also	conceivable	(Draghi,	2011).	Sure	
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enough,	only	after	roughly	half	a	year	of	working	as	the	President,	Draghi	gave	probably	his	
most	famous	speech	in	London.	Bastasin	(2015)	recalled	the	event	from	July	2012,	as	it	
marked	a	turning	point	for	the	Euro	crisis	and	was	an	implication	of	unconventional	policies	
to	come;	
	
“When	people	talk	about	the	fragility	of	the	euro	and	the	increasing	fragility	of	the	
euro,	and	perhaps	the	crisis	of	the	euro,	very	often	non-euro	area	member	states	or	
leaders	underestimate	the	amount	of	political	capital	that	is	being	invested	in	the	
euro.	And	so	we	view	this,	and	I	do	not	think	we	are	unbiased	observers	in	Frankfurt,	
we	think	the	euro	is	irreversible.	And	it’s	not	an	empty	word	now,	because	I	
preceded	saying	exactly	what	actions	have	been	made,	are	being	made	to	make	it	
irreversible.	But	there	is	another	message	I	want	to	tell	you.	Within	our	mandate,	the	
ECB	is	ready	to	do	whatever	it	takes	to	preserve	the	euro.	And...believe	me,	it	will	be	
enough	(pp.	395)”.	
	
This	speech	had	a	vast	impact	on	the	global	economy	and	especially	the	Eurozone.	Why	did	
it	make	such	a	difference?	It	is	noteworthy	that	many	political	leaders	had	assured	the	
public	that	they	would	do	anything	they	can	to	save	the	euro	and	fix	the	economy.	Yet,	they	
were	not	in	a	position	to	uphold	their	assurances.	However,	Draghi	was	not	a	political	
leader,	he	was	the	president	of	one	of	the	most	influential	central	banks	in	the	world,	which	
by	extension,	makes	him	a	powerful	person.	His	words	would	have	a	meaning	and	they	
would	make	an	impact.	This	is	exactly	why	the	markets	were	able	to	believe	his	statement	
to	do	whatever	it	takes.	Draghi	has	also	spent	time	during	his	career	in	managing	a	
multinational	investment	bank,	which	adds	to	his	expertise	on	the	financial	markets.	
Moreover,	Draghi	did	not	specify	what	these	measures	were	going	to	be	and	he	did	not	
provide	any	roadmap	to	success	during	this	speech.	Hence,	it	was	almost	impossible	to	
attack	against	his	arguments	(Brunnermeier	et	al.,	2016).	At	a	Plenary	hearing	in	April	2013,	
the	Outright	Monetary	Transactions	(OMT)	program	had	been	announced	and	Draghi	
mentioned	that	it	has	proven	to	be	an	effective	backstop	against	unfounded	fears	of	
reversibility.	Additionally,	the	strict	conditionality	of	the	program	prevented	moral	hazard	
by	the	governments.	However,	it	begs	to	question	whether	the	announcement	of	the	
program	was	needed	or	would	the	aforementioned	speech	have	sufficed.		
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Draghi	criticised	the	lack	of	preparation	on	the	member	states’	parts	in	realizing	what	it	
means	to	be	a	part	of	the	EMU:	“Prior	to	the	crisis,	Member	States	did	not	internalise	fully	
what	it	means	to	be	part	of	EMU.	Fiscal	and	economic	policies	were	not	sufficiently	geared	
towards	the	conditions	of	being	a	member	of	a	single	currency	zone.	But	the	lessons	of	the	
crisis	have	been	learnt	(Draghi,	2013a)”.	Again,	Draghi	was	asserting	power	dominance	over	
his	audience	as	the	head	of	one	of	the	most	affluent	central	banks	in	the	world.	He	also	used	
terms	such	as	“forcefully”	and	“commitment”	when	referring	to	the	implementation	of	new	
frameworks.		Late	2013,	he	mentioned	that	the	ECB	implemented	forward	guidance	to	
clarify	the	orientation	of	their	monetary	policy	path	and	stated	that	the	ECB	has	gone	
beyond	the	Treaty	requirements	in	transparency.	Additionally,	he	began	reminding	the	
Plenary	about	the	EMU	roadmap	that	encompasses	four	pillars;	the	fiscal,	economy,	banking	
and	political	union.	The	steps	taken	with	the	Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	(SSM)	and	Single	
Resolution	Mechanism	(SRM)	were	great	leaps	forward,	yet	they	were	not	sufficient	enough	
to	complete	the	EMU.	To	stabilise	the	fragmented	financial	market	and	the	EMU,	fiscal	
consolidation	was	needed	(Draghi,	2013b).		
	
In	2015,	he	recalled	the	launch	of	the	outright	purchases	as	the	Governing	Council	decreed	
that	the	monetary	policies	implemented	have	been	insufficient	as	the	inflation	rate	had	
been	on	a	downward	trend.	Therefore,	a	more	“forceful”	response	was	needed	and	the	
outright	purchases	of	securities	was	the	only	instrument	left.	Again,	he	reminded	the	
Plenary	that	the	EMU	was	not	finished	and	the	economic	convergence	had	not	been	as	
sustainable	as	hoped.	As	such,	this	constitutes	a	great	risk	when	faced	with	another	shock	of	
this	magnitude.	This	could	be	prevented	by	reforming	the	economic	structures	of	member	
states.	Draghi	also	felt	that	it	was	necessary	to	move	from	a	system	of	rules	and	guidelines	
for	national	policy	making	to	a	system	of	further	sovereignty	sharing	with	common	
institutions.	He	used	a	multitude	of	phrasing,	such	as	“need	to”	and	“is	required”	when	
commenting	on	the	lack	of	economic	and	institutional	convergence	on	the	Member	State’s	
part	(Draghi,	2015).	These	comments	feel	as	though	Draghi	was	looking	to	move	away	from	
the	foundational	rules-based	system	of	ordoliberalism.	This	similar	trend	continued	in	the	
next	hearings	as	he	was	adamant	in	that	progress	had	been	made,	yet	much	more	was	
required.	Further	improvements	and	regulations	were	needed	in	the	banking	union.	Fiscal	
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policies	should	also	contribute	to	the	economic	recovery,	not	hinder	it	and	thus,	the	
implementation	pace	of	structural	reforms	need	to	be	increased	(Draghi,	2016a;	Draghi,	
2016c).	
	
In	2018,	Draghi	noted	the	efforts	the	ECB	had	taken	to	improve	prudential	regulation	and	
supervision	over	the	financial	markets.	This,	in	addition	to	the	banking	union,	has	helped	
financial	stability.	However,	the	banking	union	was	not	a	complete	one	and	it	should	be	
further	“strengthened”	with	the	agreed	backstop	to	the	Single	Resolution	Fund	(SRF)	and	
establishing	the	European	deposit	insurance	scheme	(EDIS).	During	this	hearing,	Draghi	
additionally	touched	upon	the	concept	of	quantitative	easing	and	its	role	in	increasing	
economic	inequality.	He	acknowledged	the	negative	side	effects	as	the	distribution	of	
wealth	generally	goes	to	wealthy	institutions	or	people.	However,	the	longer-term	goals	are	
the	increase	in	employment	which,	in	turn,	would	benefit	all.	Moreover,	there	had	been	
criticism	from	some	of	the	European	Parliament	members	that	the	ECB	monetary	policy	
would	not	have	been	effective	in	unconventional	times.	Draghi	continued	to	emphasize	the	
other	institutions	and	national	governments’	responsibilities	towards	the	Eurozone	as	well	
(Draghi,	2018).	In	the	last	Plenary	hearing	in	January	2019,	Draghi	recalled	what	had	
happened	and	how	the	economic	and	financial	landscape	had	transformed,	which	also	
required	the	ECB	to	transform.	He	felt	that	the	toolbox	of	conventional	and	unconventional	
monetary	policy	instruments	have	helped	the	ECB	to	evolve	as	an	institution.	The	crisis	
showed	the	Eurozone	that	it	entered	one	with	an	incomplete	institutional	and	regulatory	
framework.	The	creation	of	the	banking	union	and	the	ESM	helped	the	Eurozone	to	prepare	
for	the	future,	yet	it	took	time	and	this	time	was	lost	for	the	recovery.	At	the	end	of	the	
hearing	Draghi	became	more	critical	and	mentioned	that	the	ECB	had	a	role	to	play	but	it	
could	not	possibly	fill	all	the	other	roles,	because	the	role	of	the	ECB	is	monetary	policy.	He	
also	criticised	the	incompleteness	of	the	EMU,	not	finishing	what	had	already	been	decided,	
namely	the	banking	union.	In	addition	to	the	capital	markets	union	and	building	more	fiscal	
capacity	(Draghi,	2019).	
	
Thus,	what	conclusions	can	be	drawn	from	Draghi’s	hearings	before	the	Plenary	of	the	
European	Parliament	over	the	years?	In	the	beginning	of	his	term,	it	seemed	that	Draghi	was	
opposed	to	quantitative	easing	and	asset	purchase	programs	and	it	seemed	to	have	taken	a	
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while	for	him	and	the	Governing	Council	to	realize	what	the	ECB	needed	to	do.	However,	
following	his	famous	speech	and	the	promise	of	buying	unlimited	amounts	of	Eurozone	
government	bonds,	the	initiation	of	the	ECB	use	of	unconventional	monetary	policy	tools	
was	ready	to	begin.	Early	in	his	tenure,	he	commented	on	the	structural	flaws	in	the	current	
system	and	the	fact	that	new	measures	are	needed	to	tackle	the	transforming	economic	and	
monetary	environment.	This	can	be	interpreted	as	an	implication	of	unconventional	policies	
and	the	need	for	a	transformation	in	addition	to	the	need	to	strengthen	the	regulatory	
framework	of	the	EMU.	For	most	of	Draghi’s	tenure	it	seems,	the	ECB	was	slowly	ridding	
itself	away	from	hawkish	and	prudent	monetary	policies.	Rather,	the	2012	speech	led	to	
dovish	quantitative	easing	a	few	years	later	by	the	bank,	which	was,	by	their	standards,	non-	
conventional.	However,	from	these	hearings,	the	encouragement	of	prudent	fiscal	policies	
can	be	observed	nevertheless.	Draghi	urged	on	multiple	occasions	that	the	Eurozone	needs	
to	have	a	fiscal	policy	that	could	make	a	difference.	He	seemed	to	be	of	the	opinion	that	
there	needed	to	be	a	move	from	rules-based	national	fiscal	policy	to	an	institution-based	
fiscal	capacity.	Monetary	policy	could	only	do	so	much	and	it	needed	a	stable	fiscal	policy	to	
complement	it	and	it	seemed	that	national	governments	have	the	fiscal	capacities	but	were	
not	using	it.	Thus,	he	shared	similarities	with	his	predecessor,	yet	the	way	to	achieve	these	
goals	were	largely	different.	He	also	acknowledged	that	when	inflation	is	too	low,	there	are	
limits	as	to	how	low	can	interest	rates	be	cut.	When	that	time	arrives,	central	banks	are	
required	to	resort	to	other	tools	than	policy	rates	to	achieve	their	goal.	Additionally,	Draghi	
was	aware	of	the	negative	side	effects	of	the	unconventional	tools	as	they	required	the	ECB	
to	operate	in	a	broader	range	of	markets.	Thus,	implying	that	the	transition	from	a	hawkish	
monetary	policy	to	dovish	was	a	required	transformation.		
	
Nearing	the	end	of	his	tenure,	strong	criticism	towards	other	institutions	and	national	
governments	can	be	observed.	Draghi	implied	that	too	much	responsibility	had	been	left	for	
the	ECB	and	the	actions	of	other	actors	were	not	sufficient	enough.	The	continuous	and	
repetitive	use	of	such	phrases	as	“we	must”,	“there	is	a	need”	and	“to	strengthen”	are	signs	
that	required	steps	towards	a	complete	economic	and	monetary	union	had	not	been	taken.	
As	mentioned,	the	ECB	is	limited	in	their	mandate	and	their	role	is	the	monetary	policy	of	
the	Eurozone.	As	a	consequence	of	the	unconventional	policies	implemented	during	
Draghi’s	term	as	the	president,	the	balance	sheet	of	ECB	more	than	doubled	following	the	
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asset	purchase	programs	of	quantitative	easing	(Gordon,	2020).	However	large	the	balance	
sheet	of	the	ECB	eventually	grew,	Draghi	is	still	viewed	by	many	as	the	man	who	saved	the	
Eurozone	and	has	been	largely	credited	for	its	survival	with	the	famous	speech	and	
subsequent	programs.	Some	wondered	whether	the	ECB	had	the	authority	to	actually	do	
whatever	it	takes,	yet	as	long	as	no	one	cared	to	find	out,	the	markets	were	happy	(Stiglitz,	
2017).	
4.3	Lagarde	(19-):	COVID-19	pandemic	and	PEPP	
Christine	Lagarde	assumed	the	seat	of	the	President	of	the	European	Central	Bank	after	
Draghi	had	served	the	fixed	eight	year	term	in	late	2019.	As	she	has	been	the	president	for	a	
short	period	of	time,	her	stance	on	monetary	policy	and	the	way	the	ECB	is	headed	is	still	
relatively	unknown.	Prior	to	her	appointment	though,	she	was	at	a	public	hearing	before	the	
Economic	and	Monetary	Committee	at	the	European	Parliament.	During	this	hearing	she	
answered	many	questions	by	members	and	cleared	some	of	her	thoughts	on	the	economic	
outlook	for	the	future.	In	her	answers,	she	acknowledged	that	they	should	be	mindful	of	the	
negative	effects	and	potential	side	effects	of	the	unconventional	policies	the	ECB	has	
implemented	as	the	long-term	impacts	are	still	uncertain.	As	important	short-term	goals	she	
saw	the	further	development	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism,	strengthening	fiscal	
capacity	and	establishing	budgetary	instruments	for	competitiveness	and	convergence	
(Committee	on	Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs,	2019).	As	such,	she	inherited	a	situation	of	
economic	uncertainty,	yet	one	of	relative	stability.	The	economic	growth	in	the	Eurozone	
was,	at	the	time,	rather	slow	and	it	was	rightful	to	ask	whether	the	ECB	had	any	weapons	
left	to	stimulate	the	economy.	Therefore,	even	without	another	major	financial	crisis,	there	
remained	a	lot	to	improve	for	the	Eurozone.	The	unconventional	monetary	policies	Draghi	
implemented	had	been	efficient	in	responding	to	the	Euro	crisis,	yet	did	not	seem	strong	
enough	in	promoting	sustainable	economic	growth	and	thus,	from	the	outset,	her	first	
challenge	should	most	likely	have	been	promoting	pro-growth	policies	to	avoid	another	lost	
decade	in	Europe.		
	
In	the	first	hearings	at	the	Committee	on	Economic	and	Monetary	affairs	of	the	European	
Parliament	in	2020,	Lagarde	stated	that	the	ECB	has	decided	to	launch	a	review	of	its	
monetary	policy	strategy	as	the	last	one	was	released	16	years	ago.	Logically,	a	great	deal	
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has	happened	and	transformed	over	the	course	of	the	years	and	thus,	the	review	is	
necessary	to	properly	evaluate	its	monetary	policy	and	whether	it	serves	the	economy	best.	
She	also	felt	that	it	was		necessary	to	enhance	communication	to	the	public	as	many	
European	do	not	know	what	the	ECB	is	and	what	it	does	(Lagarde,	2019;	Lagarde,	2020a).	At	
her	first	Plenary	hearing	in	February	2020,	she	expressed	concern	regarding	the	limits	of	
monetary	policy	as	it	could	not	and	should	not	act	as	the	panacea	for	everything.	Moreover,	
she	was	worried	that	the	longer	the	ECB	provided	accommodative	policies,	the	greater	the	
risks	became,	the	same	risks	she	mentioned	at	the	public	hearing	before	her	nomination.	
The	EMU	should	be	strengthened	with	structural	and	fiscal	policies	in	addition	to	a	full	
banking	union	(Lagarde,	2020b).	What	is	interesting	here,	is	that	Lagarde	does	not	use	
equally	“forceful”	language	as	Trichet	and	Draghi.	She	has	not	urged,	commanded	or	
implored	more	actions	from	the	national	governments	or	other	institutions,	rather	she	has	
taken	a	more	diplomatic	route	of	addressing	the	Plenary	and	Committee	with	joint	
phrasings.	She	has	encouraged	cooperation	and	combining	forces	and	joint	operations.	It	
seemed	then,	that	in	the	beginning	of	her	tenure	she	focused	on	the	same	factors	that	
Draghi	had	left	her	but	with	a	different	mindset	and	a	more	conciliatory	approach	to	
discussion.	Possibly	due	to	her	being	new	in	the	position	or	it	merely	is	her	way	of	
conducting	business.	
	
She	did	not,	however,	have	a	great	deal	of	time	to	adapt	to	her	new	role	before	the	
outbreak	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	bringing	the	already	slowing	global	economy	to	a	halt.	
Moreover,	this	was	and	is	a	crisis	brought	about	by	exogenous	factors	and	thus,	difficult	to	
assess,	as	the	situation	can	be	even	more	unpredictable	than	crises	stemming	from	
endogenous	factors.	Therefore,	no	significant	change	of	direction	from	the	ECB	has	been	
seen	yet	since	it	has	been	responding	to	the	acute	crisis	phase.	At	her	Committee	hearings	
since	the	outbreak	in	June,	September	and	November	2020,	she	mentioned	and	
complimented	the	swift	response	of	the	ECB	in	devising	its	Pandemic	Emergency	Purchase	
Programme	(PEPP),	launching	it	in	March	and	further	extending	the	envelope	in	a	short	
time.	The	programme	was	devised	“to	counter	the	serious	risks	to	the	monetary	policy	
transmission	mechanism	and	the	outlook	for	the	euro	area	posed	by	the	coronavirus	
(COVID-19)	outbreak	(European	Central	Bank,	2020b)”.	It	was	designed	to	function	only	as	a	
temporary	asset	purchase	program	for	private	and	public	sector	securities.	Initially,	the	
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programme	budget	was	set	to	€750	billion,	however	it	was	further	enlarged	by	€600	billion	
to	a	total	of	€1,350	billion	(European	Central	Bank,	2020b).	Additionally,	in	the	last	
Governing	Council	meeting	in	December	2020	it	was	decreed	that	they	shall	keep	injecting	
money	into	the	markets	to	stimulate	the	economy	and	even	increased	the	envelope	by	€500	
billion	into	a	total	of	€1,850	billion.	These	measures	shall	last	at	least	until	the	end	of	March	
2022	and	until	the	crisis	phase	of	the	coronavirus	is	judged	to	be	over	(European	Central	
Bank,	2020e).	Lagarde	additionally	acknowledged	that	more	actions	are	needed,	namely	the	
swift	implementation	of	the	Next	Generation	EU	package	as	this	would	make	a	great	impact	
on	the	recovery	of	the	Eurozone	(Lagarde,	2020c;	Lagarde	2020d;	Lagarde	2020e).	The	next	
Governing	Council	meeting	in	late	January	2021	did	not	change	anything	dramatically.	
However,	should	the	stance	of	the	ECB	change	once	the	pandemic	has	been	defeated?	
Currently,	it	seems	that	Lagarde	is	continuing	on	the	same	path	as	Draghi	but	what	happens	
after	the	pandemic,	one	can	only	guess.		
	
In	conclusion	regarding	Lagarde,	is	that	she	has	naturally	given	a	great	deal	less	speeches	as	
the	president	because	it	has	only	been	a	bit	over	a	year	since	she	started	in	the	position.	As	
such,	it	is	impossible	to	deduce	which	way	the	ECB	will	head	towards	in	the	following	years	
under	her	leadership	and	in	“normal”	conditions,	whatever	that	may	mean	in	the	near	
future.	Regardless,	some	implications	can	already	be	seen,	such	as	maintaining	a	dovish	
position	on	monetary	policy	that	Draghi	left	her	in	addition	to	stimulative	measures	brought	
on	by	the	pandemic.	Furthermore,	her	language	and	expressions	greatly	differ	from	her	
predecessors	in	a	way	that	she	conveys	her	opinions	more	diplomatically.	Trichet	and	Draghi	
had	both	asserted	their	influence	more	visibly	than	Lagarde.	What	has	also	been	observed	is	
that	Lagarde	and	the	ECB	reacted	to	COVID-19	relatively	quickly	compared	to	the	Euro	crisis.	
5	Conclusions	
Finally,	it	is	time	for	concluding	remarks	and	reflections	on	the	topics	covered:	what	kinds	of	
flaws	have	the	presidents	observed	in	the	EMU	framework,	how	the	monetary	policy	
conducted	by	the	ECB	has	shifted	between	and	what	are	the	implications	for	the	presidents	
molding	the	future?	The	topic	of	the	ECB	and	monetary	policies	have	obviously	been	more	
topical	after	both	the	financial	crisis	and	the	Euro	crisis	upon	the	realisation	that	there	are	
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severe	structural	deficiencies	in	economic	governance	of	the	Eurozone.	Additionally,	many	
academics	argue	that	even	the	whole	Eurosystem	was	created	too	quickly	and	it	was	far	
from	an	optimum	currency	area	(OCA).	Member	States	were,	for	most	part	too	different	and	
some	might	have	even	been	unable	to	follow	fiscal	policies	required	to	uphold	the	currency	
area.	A	severe	structural	flaw	was	that	only	the	monetary	policy	was	centralized,	leaving	
fiscal	policy	the	sole	responsibility	of	each	of	the	member	states	(Koskenkylä,	2016).	This,	in	
turn,	has	led	to	difficulties	in	managing	problems	that	arise	in	times	of	crises	for	the	EMU.	
Upon	analysing	the	hearings,	the	urge	to	strengthen	government	fiscal	policies	was	
repetitive	and	present	for	all	three	presidents.		
	
The	actions	of	the	ECB	in	managing	crises	has	additionally	been	interesting	and	worth	a	
mention.	They	have	been,	at	times	clumsy	and	slow	in	addition	to	the	implemented	
measures	that	have	been	inadequate.	Moreover,	the	unconventional	toolbox	utilised	have	
been	under	public	scrutiny	due	to	the	contradictory	ruling	and	interpretation	of	the	Treaty	
(Korkman,	2013).	Regardless	of	the	contradictions,	the	reputation	of	the	ECB	is	still	more	or	
less	intact	after	tumultuous	times.	Brunnermeier	(2016)	discusses	the	Euro	crisis	impact	on	
the	ECB	credibility;	
	
“According	to	some	observers,	the	ECB	came	out	with	its	reputation	enhanced,	its	
independence	fully	intact	and	near	universal	respect	from	both	inside	and	outside	
the	euro	area.	As	an	institution,	however,	it	suffered	significant	collateral	damage.	Its	
internal	cohesion	has	been	badly	shaken.	Trust	has	repeatedly	been	broken	between	
its	members.	It	was	hit	by	two	successive	resignations	from	its	governing	council	(pp.	
372)”.	
	
As	can	be	observed,	clashes	have	happened	even	within	the	Governing	Council	as	well.	
Furthermore,	many	of	their	ruling	decisions	have	not	been	unanimous	and	thus,	following	
these	crises,	public	trust	has,	at	times	been	wavering	for	the	ECB	and	should	the	trust	be	
lost	completely,	it	would	lead	to	a	crisis.	Because	of	this,	it	has	been	highly	important	for	the	
ECB	to	maintain	its	credibility	as	well,	albeit	this	is	not	stated	in	their	mandate.		
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Second,	there	is	the	problem	of	extensive	quantitative	easing	as	the	injection	of	money	into	
the	markets	has	been	the	most	utilized	measure	of	the	ECB	in	battling	slow	growth	and	the	
current	pandemic.	Though	problematic,	commonly	consensus	states	that	QE	is	needed	and	
it	is	difficult	to	currently	see	another	action	that	would	work	as	the	economy	is	suffering	due	
to	various	factors	and	thus,	money	needs	to	be	“pumped”	in	order	to	keep	the	economy	
running.	After	the	hawkish	austerity	measures	during	the	Euro	crisis	to	the	subsequent	
stimulative	and	dovish	unconventional	monetary	policies,	the	future	is	difficult,	if	not	
impossible	to	predict.	However,	it	is	clear	that	the	central	bankers	are	one	of	the	high-
profile	people	to	have	an	impact	on	that	future.	Another	thing	to	note	is	that	after	the	
historically	strange	times,	the	balance	sheet	of	the	ECB	has	exploded	dramatically	and	this	
increase	is	extraordinary	in	the	bank’s	short-lived	existence.	Only	time	will	tell	what	effects	
it	will	have	on	the	economy.	All	the	three	presidents	of	the	ECB	during	crisis	times	have	
called	for	stronger	fiscal	prudence	by	national	governments	and	have	emphasized	the	need	
for	stronger	European	integration	while	also	implementing	loose	monetary	policy	since	
2015.	Yet,	it	is	certain	that	the	ECB	has	embarked	on	a	road	of	seemingly	endless	
quantitative	easing	and	it	is	unclear	how	to	untangle	this	web	after	the	pandemic	is	over.	
The	ECB	in	addition	to	the	Fed,	along	with	many	other	central	banks	are	vowing	to	continue	
stimulating	the	economy	and	have	extended	their	emergency	purchase	programmes	in	
many	recent	decisions.	Hence,	the	sheer	size	of	the	pandemic	emergency	purchase	
programmes	alone	is	historic	as	is	the	further	continued	time	frame	of	them.	
	
Third,	the	interconnectedness	of	central	banks	and	politics	has	also	grown	stronger,	albeit	
the	European	Central	Bank	still	claims	to	be	completely	independent.	It	will	be	increasingly	
difficult	for	the	ECB	or	its	presidents	to	stay	out	of	politics	or	not	respond	to	political	
pressure	with	the	quantitative	easing	it	is	conducting	since	it	is	buying	up	such	large	
amounts	of	assets	and	thus,	having	an	influence	on	the	total	level	of	money	in	circulation.	
By	deciding	which	assets	to	buy	and	where,	it	is	also	having	an	effect	on	where	the	capital	is	
allocated	(Colliard,	2020).	This	is	also	alarming	in	the	sense	that	the	ECB	seems	intent	on	
buying	as	much	government	bonds	as	needed	to	prevent	tighter	monetary	policy	than	we	
are	currently	experiencing,	a	clear	implication	that	dovish	policies	will	continue.		
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Picture	5	Citigroup	projections	on	ECB	purchases	of	new	government	bonds	for	2021	(Stubbington,	2020)	
	
	
	
What	can	be	concluded?	In	essence,	by	analysing	the	hearings	of	the	ECB	presidents	during	
the	tenures	of	the	three	presidents	listed	in	this	thesis,	the	path	taken	has	been	clear	-	from	
hawkish	stance	during	Trichet’s	years	to	Draghi’s	change	into	a	dovish	position	and	the	
injection	of	money	into	the	markets.	The	unconventional	monetary	policies	were	started	as	
the	conventional	ones	were	not	enough	to	maintain	price	stability	amidst	crisis	times.	This	
was	a	clear	reflection	on	the	incompleteness	of	the	EMU,	the	preparedness	of	the	union	was	
inadequate.	This	was	not	ignored	by	the	presidents	of	the	ECB,	as	all	three	repeatedly	called	
on	the	completion	of	the	union.	Additionally,	as	has	been	argued	within	the	course	of	this	
thesis,	the	quantitative	easing	that	was	implemented	in	2015	was	too	little,	too	late.	Critics	
feel	that	the	slow	response	has	led	to	a	lost	decade	of	economic	growth	in	Europe.	Had	the	
large	quantitative	measures	started	earlier,	it	might	have	been	possible	to	spark	the	growth	
earlier	as	well.	Therefore,	should	the	transition	from	contractionary,	hawkish	monetary	
policy	to	accommodative,	dovish	version	have	been	implemented	earlier,	some	of	the	more	
severe	impacts	of	the	Euro	crisis	could	have	been	prevented.	As	this	did	not	happen	and	the	
Eurozone	began	their	slow	recovery	only	in	2012,	there	was	not	enough	time	before	the	
COVID-19	pandemic	brought	the	economy	to	a	halt	again.		
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Presently	though,	fear	of	indebted	European	countries	exist	as	large	stimulus	packages	have	
been	approved	and	the	ECB	keeps	on	expanding	its	asset	purchase	programs	while	
maintaining	negative	interest	rates.	With	the	increase	in	the	ECB	budget	in	addition	to	the	
already	historically	low	interest	rates,	it	begs	the	question,	have	the	central	banks	run	out	of	
weapons	to	battle	future	crises	and	how	will	the	presidents	shape	this?	What	is	the	next	
step	and	what	kind	of	monetary	policy	will	be	conducted?	
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